On Identifying the Core of EMU: An Exploration of Some Empirical Criteria by ARTIS, Michael J. & ZHANG, Wenda
Robert Schuman Centre
On Identifying the Core of EMU: 
An Exploration of 
Some Empirical Criteria




























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 97/52
Artis/Zhang: On Identifying the Core of EMU:
An Exploration of Some Empirical Criteria
WP
3£1




























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 




























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUM AN C EN TR E
On Identifying the Core of EMU:
An Exploration of Some Empirical Criteria





EUI W orking Paper RSC No. 97/52 




























































































No part o f this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission o f the authors.
©M ichael J. Artis and W enda Zhang 
Printed in Italy in October 1997 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































Programme in Economie Policy
The Working Papers series
The Schuman Centre’s Programme in Economic Policy provides a framework 
for the presentation and development of ideas and research that can constitute 
the basis for informed policy-making in any area to which economic reasoning 
can make a contribution. No particular areas have been prioritized against others, 
nor is there any preference for "near-policy" treatments. Accordingly, the scope 
and style of papers in the series is varied.
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme, 






















































































































































































The paper reports strikingly high correlations of the cyclical components of 
industrial production between the participant countries in the ERM. 
Supplementing these correlations with criteria based on real exchange rate 
volatility, trade and monetary policy conformity, cluster analysis is used tc 
identify a core group of countries for which monetary union with Germany 
seems less controversial and to define other groups for which monetary union 
might be less advisable.
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The issues explored in this paper spring from observing the phenomenon of 
business cycle affiliation. In earlier work (Artis and Zhang, 1996, 1997) we 
established that a recognizable "European" business cycle exists, centred on 
Germany. The identity of the countries involved and the timing of the 
appearance of this separate cycle led us to suggest a more specific provisional 
identification of this cycle with the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). As explained in more detail below, the ERM 
has not been a homogeneous regime and participation in it might be expected 
to encourage a business cycle affiliation with the centre country in more than 
one way. The ERM is the crucible for EMU. In this paper we go on to explore 
additional dimensions which, together with that of business cycle affiliation, 
might be good indicators of fitness to join a monetary union centred on 
Germany. (Loosely) following criteria suggested by optimal currency area 
(OCA) theory, we identify real exchange rate volatility and trade as central 
factors, along with the monetary policy discipline implied by ERM membership.
In the next section (section I) we briefly recall the basis for our assertions 
about business cycle affiliation and restate the central facts on the basis of an 
extended data sample and a changed methodology. In the following section 
(section II) we then examine some explanatory factors - relative real exchange 
rate stability, monetary policy discipline and trade - in relation to business cycle 
affiliation. These different factors can be treated as separate dimensions (if 
partially overlapping), with the aid of which it is possible to delineate an overall 
degree of linkage with the anchor country: further, by cluster analysis based on 
these dimensions, it is possible to ask whether there is a distinct "core" of 
countries inside the ERM which are most closely bound to the anchor country. 
This task is undertaken in Section III of the paper. The distinction between 
"core" and " periphery" has been heavily used in discussions of the fitness of 
ERM countries for EMU membership;1 our measurements lend some weight to 
these distinctions.




























































































Synchronization in the world business cycle
A number of studies have addressed the relationship between the exchange rate 
regime and the stochastic process driving the world economy (viz., the business 
cycle). Among the more recent of these, those by Gerlach (1988), Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) and Ahmed et al. (1993) deserve particular mention. These 
studies take the sample separation between the Bretton Woods period and after 
as marking a change of exchange rate regime and examine whether the 
international business cycle has changed between the two periods.2 The results 
have been mixed. Gerlach, for example, finds that output movements have been 
correlated across countries under both regimes and suggests that there is 
evidence of a world business cycle. Baxter and Stockman emphasize that there 
is a decline in the cross correlations between business cycles in the flexible rate 
period, suggesting that the cycle has become more country-specific. Ahmed et 
al. using an alternative approach based on a structural macroeconometric model, 
argue that the interactions between output, relative prices and relative policy 
variables as between the United States and other countries remain much the 
same in the flexible as in the previous fixed rate period and conclude that there 
is no evidence of differences in the transmission properties of economic 
disturbances between the two regimes. McKinnon (1996) has pointed to 
speculation for or against the dollar as the monetary mechanism behind what he 
sees as a decline in the coherence of a "world" business cycle since the mid- 
1980s; in particular, periods when there was speculation against the dollar gave 
rise to coordinated inflationary booms whilst when the dollar was strong there 
would be global deflationary pressure. Since the Plaza Accord and subsequent 
agreements leading to a smoothing of the dollar exchange rate the world cycle 
has become less synchronized.
In Artis and Zhang (1997) we suggested an account of the world business 
cycle in which business cycles become more group-specific after 1979, with the 
German cycle appearing to offer an alternative pole of attraction for a group of 
European countries to that afforded by the cycle in the US. More specifically, 
in that study we used monthly data on industrial production for a sample of 15 
countries over the period from January 1961 to December 1993 with a sample
I. Business cycle affiliations
2. Because the adoption of an exchange rate regime is itself an endogenous decision and 
because the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system coincided with the first oil shock, 
a potential problem of two-way causation is involved in this identification; Baxter and 
Stockman (1989) additionally examine two other episodes of exchange rate regime 




























































































split in March 1979. Cross-correlations of the cyclical components of these 
series for each country with the cyclical components of the two reference cycles 
(for the US and for Germany) established that a "European cycle" became 
visible in the second sub-sample.3 More specifically, the study suggested that 
this European cycle was confined to member countries of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), since other 
European countries were not implicated. The study also confirmed that the basic 
finding was robust to the detrending method employed; whilst the principal 
results reported (and the graphical displays) used OECD business cycle 
components which are derived by the application of the "phase-average-trend" 
(PAT) method of detrending (see Nilsson, 1987), we alternatively identified 
cyclical components by application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with two 
different settings of the dampening parameter) and by estimating a linear trend. 
Non-parametric tests for independence of the results obtained using the 
alternative detrending techniques were strongly rejected.
In Artis and Zhang (1996) we updated (to October 1995) and extended the 
size (to 19 countries) of the sample examined, confirming the results obtained 
previously. In this study OECD-detrended cyclical components were employed. 
We can conveniently begin this paper by restating the central conclusions of that 
paper in graphical form, using the extended data set, but employing - for 
reasons that will become clear below - a Hodrick-Prescott filter for detrending.4 S,
Figure 1 thus shows the business cycle cross-correlations of the countries in our 
extended data set vis-vis the two reference cycles, of the USA and Germany, in 
the period from April 1979 to October 1995. Including the two reference
3. Other researchers have also identified the emergence of a European cycle. A recent 
example is Lumsdaine and Prasad (1997), who employ an entirely different ("common 
component") approach and whose identification of a European cycle is based on data for 
the whole period from 1963 to 1994.
4. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is based on minimizing the following expression with respect 
to g,:
min ( Y , O', -g f  * * E  K«i.i * 8,) - ig , - g,. ,)12 1
S , <-l 1-2
where y, is the raw series, g, the growth component and (y,-g,) the cyclical component. 
The choice of dampening parameter X may be significant in our case, where we have 
chosen a relatively high value of >.=500,000. This reflects the fact that our data frequency 
is monthly and that industrial production is a relatively noisy series, together with the 
constraints that a) g should be assumed to be basically increasing and b) the resultant 












































































































Figure 1. Cross-correlation with the US/German business cycle




























































































countries the data set comprises 19 countries in all, including all ERM member 
countries together with some other European countries, Japan, Canada and the 
United States. For reference purposes it is important that we should define the 
group of ERM countries. The original member countries of the ERM are: 
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and Italy. From 
the date of the 1992 crisis until November 1996, when it "re-entered" the 
Mechanism, the Italian lira was effectively withdrawn from the ERM. Spain 
joined the Mechanism in June 1989, Portugal in April 1992 and Austria in 
January 1995; in all three of these cases, there was a period prior to formal 
membership during which the countries effectively "shadowed" the DM or the 
ECU. For Austria this apprenticeship period was a long one and the schilling 
was targeted against the DM within a narrow band (Hochreiter and Winckler, 
1995). Finland did not join the Mechanism until 1996, outside our sample 
period.
The UK joined the Mechanism only in October 1990 and was forced out in 
the speculative crisis of September 1992. The Figure shows that all the ERM 
countries, with the exception of Denmark and, more markedly, Ireland, are more 
strongly affiliated to the German than to the American business cycle. 
(Curiously, perhaps, the same is true of Japan). The correlation coefficients for 
France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Austria are especially high, above 0.6, 
whilst their links with the US business cycle are much weaker. The UK, together 
with Sweden and Finland, exhibits quite a strong link with the US cycle.
The ERM has not been a homogeneous regime: as indicated, some countries 
joined late with a prior apprenticeship period of variable length and rigour; some 
countries have taken more advantage of the realignment procedures for changing 
the central exchange parity than others; the width of the exchange rate band, 
generally set at +/- 2.25% before the crisis of 1993, was then enlarged to +/- 
15%, whilst for some countries (Italy until 1991, Spain), the band of fluctuation 
was set at +/- 6% prior to the crisis. Furthermore, some countries availed 
themselves of controls over capital flows until the mid-80s, which allowed them 
to deviate from the monetary policy discipline exerted by the centre country.
We start with a presumption that enduring membership of an exchange rate 
union is likely to imply a conformity in the business cycle with partner countries 
or with the anchor country (Canzoneri (1982)) explores related issues in a 
theoretical model of intervention policy).5 There are various ways in which this
5. A contrary presumption might be thought to arise from the fact that if a country has 
dedicated its policy instruments to sustaining an exchange rate peg it cannot at the same 




























































































might come about - most notably, through the discipline exerted by the monetary 
policy of the anchor country and through the strengthening of trade links implied 
by the stabilization of exchange rates. The non-homogeneity of the ERM as a 
regime means that to examine these facets of the issue we need to find some 
continuous measures with respect to which we might associate a country’s 
business cycle affiliation. This is the task of the next section of the paper.
II. Monetary union criteria
In the previous section of this paper we examined the affiliation of the business 
cycles of the economies we have under study with the reference cycles of 
Germany and the USA. In this section we probe these affiliations more deeply.
OCA theory advises that countries which trade a great deal with each other 
are good candidates for monetary union (since the benefits of monetary union, 
in terms of transactions costs saving, will be enhanced), provided that they do 
not suffer too markedly from asymmetric shocks (since this would raise the costs 
of monetary union, implicit in the surrender of an independent monetary policy). 
Our choice of variables to investigate can be motivated by appeal to these 
criteria. We select four variables for investigation: these are real exchange rate 
volatility, monetary policy linkage and export and import linkages. In each case, 
these are defined in respect of the two reference economies, the US and 
Germany, and results are presented in terms of correlations with the reference 
economy values. Table 1 collects together the numerical results of this cross­
correlation analysis, which will be
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discussed as we consider each of these relationships in turn. The association 
between values of these variables and the business cycle correlations is graphed 
in Figure B1 - B4 in appendix B, whilst Table 2 reports rank correlations across 
the variables.
Real Exchange Rate Volatility
We begin with the relationship between real exchange volatility and the 
reference business cycle. It was noticeable from Figure 1 that most of the 
countries of the ERM, with the principal exclusion of Ireland and the newcomer, 
Finland, are more strongly affiliated to the German business cycle than to that 
of the United States. We might expect that this has something to do with the fact 
that the ERM regime stabilised exchange rates between countries. There is a 
literature which suggests (though weakly) that exchange rate volatility may 
discourage trade: to this extent, volatility would undermine the extent to which 
trade could transmit the cycle. The classical optimum currency area literature 
also implies that asymmetric shocks between countries might be buffered by real 
exchange rate variation: to this extent, lower exchange rate volatility might 
suggest an absence (other things equal) of asymmetric shocks and, to this extent, 
greater business cycle conformity.6
Although the proximate declared targets of the ERM are nominal exchange 
rates, its operation, particularly in the earlier stages, exemplified a desire to 
stabilise real exchange rates. It was this that supported the European 
Commission’s (1990) finding that there was no cointegration between nominal 
and real bilateral DM exchange rate within the ERM. The extent to which real 
exchange rates were stabilised has varied between countries (and, to an extent, 
over time). On the other hand, the dollar exchange rates of our sample of 
countries have been floating relatively freely during the period under 
examination and the volatility of nominal rates has, through persistence in prices, 
translated into volatility in real rates, as Krugman (1996), for example, has 
pointed out. These distinct experiences are reflected in Figure B1. In the top half 
of this Figure we plot bilateral real dollar exchange rates for each country 
against that country’s business cycle cross-correlation with the US cycle. In the 
bottom half we plot real bilateral DM exchange rates against cross-correlations 
with the German cycle. Real exchange rates are obtained by deflating by relative 
wholesale (or producer) prices, whilst volatility is measured by the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of the series over the whole sample period.
6. It must be said that the paper by Canzoneri et al. (1996) explores a related issue and 




























































































It is immediately apparent that dollar volatility is much greater than DM 
volatility and that it bears essentially very little relationship to the degree of 
affiliation of a country to the US business cycle. Canada is an obvious outlier. 
In the case of the DM, however, there is a strong negative relationship between 
volatility in a country’s real bilateral exchange rate and that country’s affiliation 
with the German business cycle: Japan is an obvious outlier in this case. This 
difference between the association of business cycle correlation and real 
exchange rate volatility is borne out in Table 2, where the rank correlation is 
shown to be strongly significantly negative in the case where Germany is the 
reference country and insignificant in the case where the US is the reference 
country. Countries in what is often termed the EMU "core" (correctly, according 
to our further results) - France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium - have 
high cyclical cross-correlations and low volatility, whilst the US and Canada 
have low cyclical correlations and relatively high exchange rate volatility. 
Among the ERM members, the newcomer, Finland, has the highest exchange 
rate volatility and the lowest cyclical correlation; the UK - after the US, Canada 
and Japan, exhibits the greatest exchange rate volatility - and the lowest business 
cycle correlation among the European countries, after Finland and Ireland.
Monetary Policy Effects
The defence of the nominal exchange rate bands to which ERM member 
countries are committed has been undertaken by a mix of sterilized foreign 
exchange market intervention, both within and at the edge of the bands and, 
more importantly, by interest rate policy. As the anchor country of the ERM, 
Germany has generally been assumed to have undertaken monetary policy 
leadership. The extent to which this would be reflected in a correlation between 
the interest rates in the non-German countries and those in Germany itself would 
be moderated by the existence, for part of the period, of capital exchange 
controls in certain of the countries (notably, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium), 
which broke the arbitrage between on- and off-shore interest rates; idiosyncratic 
factors associated with speculative attacks would also moderate the correlation. 
Finally, the bands of fluctuation would allow for changes in the interest rate 
linkage, whether those bands were accepted as credible or not.7 To the extent 
to which a correlation exists between interest rates in Germany and those in 
other countries, however, we might be entitled to conclude, first, that this 
implies a common policy component in the business cycle; second, that it may 
reflect a comparative absence of asymmetric shocks between the countries; third,
7. The "honeymoon effect" inducing an inverse relationship between the interest differential 
and the currency’s position within the band (implying a strengthening belief in the 





























































































that it conveys a "revealed commitment" to the anchor country’s counter- 
inflationary policies.8
In order to examine the monetary policy linkages, we have computed and 
detrended series of real interest rates for each country. The interest rates 
concerned are short, 3-month, rates which we assume largely reflect the 
monetary authorities’ policy stance and real rates are computed using actual 
inflation (CPI) data. The detrending is undertaken through the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, using the same dampening parameter as for the business cycle series. The 
data are monthly. Table 1 shows the computed cross-correlations between the 
cyclical components of the interest rate cycle and the business cycle; the results 
are displayed in Figure B2, where the upper panel pertains to correlations with 
the US interest rate cycle and the US business cycle, whilst the lower panel 
pertains to correlations with Germany.
With the exception of Canada, few of the cross-correlations between the 
interest cycle and the business cycle in the US are at all high among our sample; 
for a number of European countries, the correlation is negative. Within the 
group of ERM countries, however, there are a number of quite high correlations 
to be found with the German interest rate cycle; the Netherlands and Belgium 
exhibit the highest cross-correlations, with France, Italy and Austria showing a 
more moderate degree of positive correlation. All these countries exhibit high 
cross-correlations in their business cycles. Switzerland is an example of a non- 
ERM country with a high correlation in its interest rate cycle, though, as already 
noted, it has a relatively low attachment to the German business cycle. As Table 
2 shows, however, rank correlations across the whole sample are insignificant 
in this case.
The trade linkage
The "ERM effect" creating a high degree of business cycle affiliation with 
Germany might be a straightforward trade phenomenon. That is, trade linkages 
provide an obvious channel for the transmission of cyclical impulses, whilst the 
optimal peg literature simply shows that in choosing an exchange rate peg a 
country should use a bilateral trade criterion (see, e.g., Edison and Melvin 
(1990)). A recent paper by Frankel and Rose (1996) indeed demonstrates a 
strong positive relationship between bilateral trade intensity and the cross­
8. A willingness to commit to partner (anchor) country policies of high counter-inflationary 
credibility is an objective of the "new" optimal currency area criteria (eg. Tavlas (1993)) 




























































































correlation of GDP shocks.9 In this paper we examine the cross correlations 
between the cyclical components of exports and imports of our sample of 
countries vis-a-vis the reference countries and the relationship between these 
correlations and the business cycle correlations. Specifically, monthly time series 
of exports and imports of goods are detrended using the same Hodrick-Prescott 
filter as applied to the industrial production series; we then examine the 
correlation between the cyclical components of the reference country’s import 
(export) series and the other country’s export (import) series.
The results, noted in the last four columns of Table 1, are displayed in 
Figures B3 and B4. Note that these refer to series of total exports and imports, 
not, as might be preferred, bilateral trade. It may be the sheer size of US trade 
which yields the strong positive relationship revealed in the top half of Figure 
B3 (less so in Figure B4) between trade and business cycle components. There 
is a similar positive relationship to be found for Germany as the reference 
country in Figure B4 (much less so in Figure B3). Table 2 reports significant 
positive rank correlations in all cases, however.
The results reported in Tables 1-2 and graphed in Figures B1-B4 serve to 
provide partial evidence on what it is about the ERM grouping that serves to 
support the business cycle affiliation revealed in Figure 1. The ERM has not 
been a homogeneous regime and countries differ in the extent to which their 
participation in it has implied a high degree of correlation in their monetary 
policy cycles with that of Germany, the extent to which their trade impulses are 
linked and the extent to which volatility in their exchange rates has been 
contained. All these variables can be measured in a continuous fashion and it 
seems that, whilst they may overlap to some extent, each provides a dimension 
along which, it is possible to argue, a closer affiliation to the anchor country can 
be obtained. In the next section we explore this idea further, using cluster 
analysis to do so.
III. Cluster analysis
In this section, cluster analysis is proposed to examine the similarities and 
dissimilarities of economic structure and to uncover homogeneous subgroups in 
the data set without any attempt at formal definitions of groups. With the EMU 
agenda in mind, we specialize to consider five variables, with Germany as the 
benchmark: these are 1) synchronisation in business cycle; 2) volatility in real
9. Their empirical finding resolves a theoretical ambiguity, for, as Frankel and Rose point 





























































































exchange rates; 3) synchronisation in real interest rate cycle; 4) synchronisation 
in import-export cycle and 5) synchronisation in import-export cycle, which are 
reported in Table 1.
The agglomerative nesting algorithms used in this paper are discussed here 
very briefly: see, for example, Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990), Anderberg 
(1993), for more details. In the terminology of cluster analysis there are N 
objects and p variables in a data set with N=18 and p=5 in this study,10 1which 
are denoted as X,,...,XN, (Xj=(xjl,...,x]p) for j=l,2,...,N)M. The dissimilarity 
coefficient or distance, d(j,k), between two objects, Xj and Xk, is defined as the 
Euclidean distance12
d(j, k) , E  0)r*u)2N '-i
( l )
The definition of the dissimilarity coefficient between two clusters is important 
in determining the shape of the homogenous groups. There exist many 
agglomerative algorithms which differ only in the definition of dissimilarity 
between clusters. In order to examine the robustness of the results, two of the 
most often used approaches are adopted in this analysis: centroid clustering and 
the group-average clustering method. Both of these produce ball-shaped clusters 
(Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990)).
For the centroid clustering method, a cluster (Oj once formed is represented 
by its centroid x(<»j), which, together with its coordinates xk(cOj) (for k=l,2,...p), 
may be expressed as:
10. Missing values for the Greek interest rate are interpolated by group averages.
11. It is often suggested that each variable should be standardized so that they are treated as 
having equal importance in determining the structure. Since four variables in this study 
are measured by the cross-correlation coefficients which are already "standardised", we 
only standardise the remaining variable, real exchange rate volatility, by normalizing its 
mean and standard deviation to the average values those moments have in the other four 
variables.
12. With only 18 observations in our sample, it is difficult to choose a proper mathematical 
form to express the distribution of this data set. In this paper, we use the distance to 




























































































) ’  (*, ^?(SjL,?*, (up), jy (u;) - 1
H I
for f-l,2 ,...,p  (2 )
where | cOj | denotes the number of objects in the cluster. The dissimilarity 
coefficient, d(cOj,cok), between two clusters, to, and cok, is then defined as the 
Euclidean distance between two centroids. The dissimilarity of two clusters 
defined by the group-average clustering method may be expressed as:
d ( u y, u t ) £  d O', *)
yecoy, /tewjj
(3)
Both methods start from a classification denoted as Q0=[co,°,...,coN0] with N 
clusters in it and each cluster containing only one object. The algorithms proceed 
by successively merging two clusters into one at each stage until a single cluster 
is obtained. The merging criterion at each stage is to choose two clusters which 
have the least dissimilarity between them. A new classification at stage i, 
Qi=[co,',...,coN.jl], is identified after two clusters have been merged and the 
dissimilarities between clusters may be updated. For example, COj"1 and cok"', are 
merged to form a new cluster co,' at stage i, the dissimilarity d(co,',cora"1) of coj 
to any other cluster com' ' may be updated in centroid clustering by using the 
following formula
lup'l H Id2(u ; ,u „ p = -^ - 2 ^ (a , ; ',u : ,)+- ^ _ 2 ^ (G>:
HI Hi
i 1-1-i H _
n '
lull2
l ,2/ i-l 1-1»-d\u>j , u k ) (4)
The centroid of co,1 may be written as a function of those of o p 1 and o)k"':
,  , - U  H ’l-,•r(“ i) » — —*(uj ) + ----—x(ot )
l“ il lull
(5)
In a similar way, the dissimilarity of a new cluster to any other cluster may also 
be updated in group-average clustering method.
The main purposes of this analysis are to investigate 1) whether the data set 
itself presents a structure and 2) how a gradual merging of groups reveals itself 




























































































the agglomerative coefficient (AC).13 Two sets of results produced by centroid 
clustering and group-average clustering are reported in Table 3, 4 and the tree 
diagrams shown in Figure 2, 3 reproduce the information given in Table 3. The 
two methods provide similar pictures; in particular, they identify the identical 
core group, a robust finding which deserve emphasis. For convenience, we may 
concentrate on the results achieved using the centroid clustering method in the 
following discussion.
A clear pattern may be observed in Figure 2 in that various groups are 
formed at various stages. For example, a classification containing 5 groups is 
identified at stage 13: the US group {US, Canada, Sweden, Finland}; the 
European group {Italy, Ireland, UK, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, Greece, 
Spain}; the core group {France, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium}, with 
Switzerland and Japan forming two separate groups. The cases of Switzerland 
and Japan are worth noting as they can not be merged into any groups even at 
this late stage, suggesting that there are features of these two countries which are 
quite different from those of the merged groups.
13. The AC is a quantity between 0 and 1 by definition. A value of the AC close to 1 
indicates that a clear clustering structure has been identified and a value close to 0 
indicates that there is no structure in the data set (see, for example, Kaufman and 
Rousseeuw (1990) for detailed information). It is also indicated that values between 0.26 
to 0.50; between 0.51-0.70 and between 0.71 -1.00 respectively suggest a ’weak’, 





























































































Table 3. Merging process









17 {US, Canada} 12.99 .2853 {US, Canada} 12.99 .2853
16 {France, Austria} 11.52 .3363 {France, Austria} 11.52 .3363
15 {Denmark, Portugal} 11.12 .3564 {Denmark, Portugal} 11.12 .3564
14 {Cluster 15, Norway) 9.43 .4022 {Greece, UK} 10.32 .4134
13 {Cluster 14, Greece} 8.64 .4044 {Cluster 15, Norway} 9.59 .4399
12 {Italy, Ireland} 8.59 .4818 {Italy, Ireland} 9.32 .4818
11 {Cluster 12, UK} 8.29 .4815 {Netherlands, Belgium} 9.39 .4887
10 {Netherlands, Belgium} 8.78 .4887 {Cluster 12, Cluster 14} 8.86 .5349
9 {Cluster 11, Cluster 13} 6.69 .5079 {Spain, Sweden} 9.23 .5453
8 {Cluster 9, Spain} 6.87 .5227 {Cluster 16, Cluster 11} 8.41 .6310
7 {Cluster 16, Cluster 10} 6.96 .5570 {Cluster 10, Cluster 13} 7.43 .6446
6 {Sweden, Finland} 8.04 .6034 {Cluster 7, Cluster 9} 7.19 .7104
5 {Cluster 17, Cluster 6} 8.67 .6023 {Cluster 17, Finland} 7.95 .7261
4 {Cluster 8, Switzerland} 9.65 .7140 {Cluster 6, Switzerland} 8.65 .8648
3 {Cluster 5, Cluster 4} 7.39 .7383 {Cluster 4, Japan} 10.21 9452
2 {Cluster 3, Japan} 11.13 .8889 {Cluster 5, Cluster 3} 11.13 .9874
1 {Cluster 2, Cluster 7} - 1.0586 {Cluster 2, Cluster 8} - 1.2512
Agglomerative
coefficient not available 0.55
Note: The Pseudo F statistic measures the separation among all the clusters at the current level 
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The US and Canada are merged into one group at stage one with the lowest 
dissimilarity coefficient (0.2853) among all countries, indicating that the two 
countries have the most similar economic structure (recall that, by construction, 
the relevant similarity here is distance from Germany). Sweden and Finland are 
merged into one group at stage 12, and in the following stage, the group {US, 
Canada} and the group {Sweden, Finland} are fused into one large group {US, 
Canada, Sweden, Finland}. The merging process for Sweden and Finland may 
not be surprising given that their business cycles, import and export cycles are 
much more in phase with the US ones as we discussed in Part II. Indeed 
bilateral trade intensity data, which we do not use in this study, also shows that 
the proportions of their exports destined for Germany are among the lowest 
within the European countries. Taylor (1995) shared the same view that "Similar 
reservations can be expressed about Sweden and Finland, which are often held 
to be strong candidates for EMU", as he explained that "Finland’s structural 
problem reflects mainly that economy’s heavy past reliance on trade with the 
Comecon area, the collapse of which necessitated major adjustment in Finnish 
industry at the end of the 1980s. That process may still have some way to go".
The European group
The European group may be observed at various stages: Denmark, Portugal, 
Norway and Greece are grouped at stage 5; Italy, Ireland and the UK are 
merged at stage 7; the two groups are fused into one together with Spain at 
stage 10 and joined by Switzerland at stage 14. A group containing 9 European 
countries is identified as: {Italy, Ireland, UK, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, 
Greece, Spain, Switzerland}, which merges neither with the US group nor with 
the core group, suggesting that the intra-group structure in this group is much 
more similar than the inter-group structure. Although none of them is merged 
with the core group, the distance between each individual country and the 
centroid of the core group may be calculated and their rankings are as follows: 
Portugal (0.559),14 Switzerland (0.562), Italy (0.600), Denmark (0.602), 
Norway (0.634), Greece (0.678), Ireland (0.709), Spain (0.809) and the UK 
(0.818), indicating that Portugal and Switzerland are the closest to the core 
group, while Spain and UK are the furthest away. It may be of interest to note 
that Switzerland is quite close to the core group among the European countries, 
even though the country can still not be merged either into the European group 
or the core group even at very late stage. This predominantly reflects the
14. The figures in brackets denote the Euclidean distance between each individual country 




























































































phenomenon that the business cycle in Switzerland is in phase more often with 
the US cycle, while Switzerland has large trade with Germany.
The core group
One of the most interesting features observed in Figure 2 is the merging process 
for the group {France, Austria, Netherlands Belgium}: France with Austria and 
the Netherlands with Belgium are linked at the stages with relatively small 
dissimilarities. Once two groups are merged into a cluster at 0.5570, no single 
country is allowed to be merged into this group until the final stage when all 
countries are grouped, indicating that the countries in the core group have 
common features which may not be fully shared by other countries. Although 
clustering analysis only reveals that more homogeneous subgroups have been 
found in the data set, the discussions in Part II have already shown that the 
structure of this subgroup is most similar to that of Germany. It is in this sense 
that we may be able to refer this subgroup to a core group of four countries 
around Germany. With a core of four countries, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Austria around Germany, there is a European group of 9 
countries, within which Portugal, Switzerland, Italy and Denmark are closer to 
the core group and the UK, Spain and Ireland are less close. The structure of the 
Sweden and Finland group is more similar to that of the US group than to the 
European group’s.
The agglomerative coefficient for the group-average clustering method is 
0.55, suggesting that a reasonable structure has been found in the data set. The 
pseudo F statistic in centroid clustering peaks at 9.65, indicating there might be 
4 clusters in the data, although this method is not used to search for the optimal 
number of clusters, but rather to describe the data in a hierarchical way.
To summarise, by using clustering analysis, the classification of the core 
group together with the US and European group partially agrees and partially 
disagrees with the "common" definitions of the groups in the literature. For 
example, a core group ready for the EMU and a "peripheral" group not ready 
for the EMU as viewed by Taylor (1995) consists of, respectively, a group 
formed by Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark (if 
willing), Austria plus (tentatively) France; and a group of four: Portugal, 
Greece, Spain plus (tentatively) Italy. He also views Finland, Sweden, Ireland 
and the UK as countries which are left in between. Canzoneri et al (1996) 
examine a smaller set of countries (Austria, the Netherlands, France, Spain, the 
UK and Italy) using a VAR approach to answer the question whether nominal 
exchange rate changes appear or not to act as a shock absorber for goods market 
disturbances. Their largely negative answer leads them to identify an inner core 




























































































to distinguish that group from Spain and the UK, where also nominal exchange 
rate changes appear to be responding to promptings arising in the financial 
markets rather than in the goods markets. Italy is the most exceptional country 
in their analysis.
IV. Conclusions
The starting point for this study was a previous identification of a rather striking 
correlation between the business cycles of Germany and its partner countries in 
the ERM; onlvCTreland^and the (X J K j ne^e a strong exception to this 
identification. Using a Hodrick-Prescott filter on monthly data for industrial 
production, we began this paper by restating that correlation for the period since 
the start of the ERM to September 1995. The ERM has not been a homogenous 
regime and member countries have engaged in it on terms that differ by the 
length of time of their participation in it, the rigour and length of their prior 
apprenticeship periods, the size of the fluctuation band within which they 
maintained their parities, the frequency of the recourse made to realignments and 
the presence or absence of capital exchange controls and so on. It does seem, 
though, that the lower the degree of real bilateral DM exchange rate volatility, 
the higher the business cycle correlation with Germany.
The ERM can be thought of as the crucible for EMU. Under the terms of 
the Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), European Union member 
countries are bound to the objective of moving forward to full monetary union. 
Whilst the Treaty sets out "entry criteria" which relate to sustainable low 
inflation and sustainable fiscal policies that do not conflict with the maintenance 
of a "stability culture", economists have typically preferred to appeal to OCA 
criteria to determine which countries might be most fit to join a monetary union 
with Germany. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) define a "core" group of 
countries and a "periphery" based on identifying cross-correlations of supply and 
demand disturbances. That core contains Belgium, the Netherlands. Denmark 
and France.15 Canzoneri et al (1996) examine a smaller set of countries 
(Austria, the Netherlands, France, Spain, the UK and Italy) using a VAR 
approach to answer the question whether nominal exchange rate changes appear 
or not to act as a shock absorber for goods market disturbances.
15. This group is characterized by distinctively high correlations of supply disturbances with 
those in Germany; perhaps surprisingly, the Netherlands does not display a high 




























































































In our paper we approach the identification of a core by using cluster 
analysis based on several variables chosen loosely to reflect OCA considerations. 
Whilst the analysis of section II shows that there is some association between 
these variables the overlap is much less than complete, so our cluster analysis 
includes all five - business cycle correlations with Germany, volatility in the real 
bilateral DM exchange rate, correlations between the cyclical components of the 
real interest rate cycle in Germany and in the country concerned and correlations 
of the cyclical components of imports and exports with those found for 
Germany. This monetary policy variable might be thought of as corresponding 
to a criterion of the "new OCA" approach in so far as it points to a revealed 
commitment to a "stability-oriented" monetary policy.
On this basis the cluster analysis identifies a core group consisting of 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria: this is similar to the 
core group identified by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, save that they do not 
include Austria in their sample and we do not find Denmark to belong to the 
core. Subject to the more limited sample covered and the important caveat that 
they do not consider the inner core group to be especially well defined against 
the rest, our results also parallel those of Canzoneri et al. in this respect.
According to our analysis there are two substantial additional groups 
comprising, on the one hand, the US group {US. Canada, Swpden, Finland) and 
on the other the European group '{Portugal, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, 
Norway, Greece, Ireland, Spain, UK}. Within these two groups, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Italy and Denmark are viewed as the "least peripheral" and Spain 
and the UK may still have some way to go, while Sweden and Finland distance 
themselves from the core group.
Clearly, the groupings detected are a function, inter alia, of the variables 
which are included.16 It would be easy to suggest alternatives and supplements. 
Supplements would probably make rather little difference, given the number 
already included, but alternatives might change the discriminating power of the 
cluster analysis.
16. We have also experimented on other variables such as the bilateral trade intensity with 
Germany where the core group is identified as {France, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, 
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